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Public sector reform (PSR) efforts in developing countries have been less 
than successful in the past. Motivated by budgetary considerations, they have 
focused on downsizing and procedural changes without radically altering the 
outmoded incentive system, which, in many countries, is now characterised by 
declining real wages, wage compression, and a non-merit promotion and reward 
system. Using results from the incentives literature, this paper argues that, for a 
reform effort to succeed, public sector human resource management (HRM) will 
have to be reformed at an early stage to establish productivity incentives in the 
public sector. These will include introducing substantial autonomy to 
organisations in their work, incentive schemes, and HRM along the lines of the 
now well-accepted concept of central bank independence.  
Past PSR efforts have also attempted to conduct a unified reform effort 
led centrally by the ministry of finance. A continuous process like PSR—spread 
out over a considerable period and involving many different people and 
organisations—might need to build in decentralisation, local leadership and 
local incentives, and HRM.  
PSR m ust be based on the recognition that people are at the heart of 
public service. As a result, managing human resources must be at the centre of 
any effort. The people who are at the center of this change can either be its 
architects and beneficiaries or its losers and therefore opponents of change. 
Design and implementation of reforms must, therefore, be sensitive to this 
important fact. It is essential that the reform is led by individuals at the 
organisation level who understand the vision as well as process of change. 
Governments must empower such leadership to guide, initiate, innovate, and 
manage change. 
 
JEL classification:  J21; J31  




1.  A HISTORY OF THE “DEVELOPMENT APPROACH”  
TO GOVERNANCE 
Both development economics and developing countries were born post-
World War II, when the “Great Reversal” was at its height and communism had 
captured the popular imagination [Rajan and Zingales (2001)]. Although it was 
also the era of struggle between capitalism and communism, both sides were 
intent on building strong, closed regulatory states with large governments and an 
emphasis on welfare. The new states that emerged from retreating colonialism 
took on the mantle of economic development, and the new development 
economics formulated a philosophy to deliver this development. Following the 
thinking of the time, the policy paradigm quickly established that it was for the 
government to lead development [Haque and Montiel (1994)].  
The result was a long era of government-led development that centralised 
policy- and decision-making, initiated planning, and created a wide range of 
public sector institutions. The role of the government was thus extended into 
areas that were conceptually indefensible. In this manner, the power of the 
public servant grew, as did his or her rent-seeking opportunities. Public sector 
employment expanded; governments learnt the political advantages of 
expanding public employment; and the public became accustomed to secure, 
non-demanding public sector jobs.
1  
Countries resorted to borrowing externally and domestically to finance 
this large, growing, and dominating public sector. However, as the inefficiencies 
of the sector, the distortions of a closed economy, and an extensive regulatory 
structure began to inhibit growth and development, it became apparent that the 
development model needed revision. Meanwhile, stagflation in industrialised 
countries also forced a rethinking of the welfare/regulatory state.  
Development indicators measuring social and economic health have all 
remained fairly stubborn in the face of alternative policy paradigms. More 
recently, this frustration led to a rising interest in the catchall term “governance” 
in the 1990s. Now, considerable research carried out during that time has shown 
that “governance matters”.
2 
                                                 
Acknowledgements:  The author would like to thank the participants of the PIDE Nurturing 
Minds Seminar Series for comments and suggestions. 
1“During the 1970s and 1980s, the wage bill of many developing country governments 
ballooned as new ministries, departments, and state-owned enterprises were created. These countries 
found there was little left over for public investment programmes after paying the wage bill. 
Resources were spread so thinly that service delivery suffered.” [Mukherjee and Manning (2002)].  
2Kaufman and Kraay have done some very good work in this area [see Kaufman and Kraay 
(2003 and 2003a)].   2 
Efforts to dismantle the excessive state were put into place through 
policies under the “Washington Consensus”. The new aims were to “remove 
distortions”, “get the prices right”, and “fiscal consolidation”, followed by 
“privatisation and internalisation”. Disjointed efforts to dismantle the earlier 
planning structures and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) led to a fragmented 
public sector. Fiscal c onsolidation was achieved through sporadic efforts to 
reduce expenditure and raise revenues. Since reducing public sector employment 
was politically risky, expenditure-reduction measures often relied on nominal 
wage freezes, which eventually translated into real wage cuts.  
Civil service reform (CSR) acquired a certain prominence in development 
policy in the 1990s. More often than not, governments undertook CSR under 
budgetary pressure. Pressured by macroeconomic imbalances, many 
governments promised to cut the size of their bureaucracy on the advice of most 
international agencies. Experience has shown that even this limited objective 
was not achieved. In many cases, the result was demoralisation and a further 
deterioration in the quality of government services as the public sector reacted to 
these strategic attacks on its recently expanded mandate in three ways:
3 
  (i)  by slowing down reform in critical areas to maintain its grip on 
resources;  
  (ii)  by seeking alternative means to make up for the real wage cut that 
public sector employees were experiencing: thus, “perks”—legalised 
and non-transparent means of non-wage resource extraction—became 
a major form of civil servants’ emoluments while tolerance towards 
corruption significantly increased; and  
  (iii)  by the more skilled, less corrupt, and those seeking a more reform-
oriented approach opting out of the public sector and, as opportunities 
shrank domestically, out of the country. 
The result was an overgrown and fragmented public sector that had 
rapidly lost its skills and developed a tolerance for corruption and inefficiency. 
It is not surprising that, in this milieu, growth and investment slowed down 
sharply and perceptions of country risk increased significantly.  
As in the rest of economic theory and, indeed, in life, there is a choice 
between “quality” and “quantity” in government employment and CSRs. The 
“governance good” is a product of the public sector and we must understand 
how it is produced, how it fits into the growth model, and how we can protect its 
production from political pressures. Only recently has political economy begun 
to ask such questions, and we are beginning to understand some of the key 
issues relating to building governance. It is not surprising that the early stages of 
CSR focused merely on downsizing the government and some procedural 
                                                 
3See United Nations Development Programme (1999) for a summary of experiences with 
downsizing.   3 
improvements, rather than assessing the role of governance in the economy. 
While we still do not have a precise model of the role that governance and the 
public sector play in the growth process, several empirical indicators of 
governance have been developed and have proven that it is an important variable 
in explaining an economy’s performance.
4  
The governance good is produced by the public sector and its 
employees. International financial and aid agencies have carried out CSRs in 
several countries but with very limited success. Public sector productivity 
remains low in many of these countries, wage bills high, and employment 
excessive despite these efforts. This paper argues that one reason for the lack 
of success in implementing CSR is that recent developments in the theory of 
incentives in organisations has received inadequate attention. We will 
summarise several key results from this important but technical literature to 
see what we can learn about conducting CSRs that improve domestic 
productivity.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 summarises the current 
state of CSR experience. We then review the empirical facts on the employment 
and incentive structure of the civil service in Section 3. Section 4 reviews the 
rich and rapidly growing incentives literature to summarise some key results that 
can be used in the CSR/public sector reform (PSR) process. Section 5 discusses 
key lessons from the incentives literature as a basis for designing a PSR plan. 
Section 6 brings in some results from the sociological and management 
literature, arguing that, since the PSR exercise involves the large government 
sector, we must adopt a multidisciplinary approach. The conclusion in Section 7 
summarises some of the main results.  
 
2.  THE CSR EXPERIENCE 
In general, CSRs have been less than successful, and governments now 
often balk at the term since it seems to connote undertaking a long-term effort 
that only arouses negative feelings in the civil service itself. In an extensive 
evaluation
5 of the CSR experience of the 1990s, the World Bank (1999) notes 
that “Bank-supported CSRs were largely ineffective in achieving sustainable 
results in downsizing, capacity building, and institutional reform… in part, due 
to significant political difficulties in implementing CSRs. Yet the relevance and 
ownership of reforms were also weakened by a technocratic approach that failed 
to mainstream institutional analysis and develop a coherent framework for 
intervening in administrative systems”. 
                                                 
4Rivera-Batiz (1999) shows that an increase in the quality of governance by one standard 
deviation increases gross domestic product (GDP) growth by 1.2 percentage points: “Democracy is a 
key ingredient of growth but only if it is associated with improved governance”. 
5The study sample comprises 124 loans approved in 32 client countries, as well as economic 
and sector work (ESW) from a sub-sample of 11 countries during 1980–97.   4 
Box 1 summarises this experience and the key lessons learnt as laid out  
in  the  Bank  Operations  Evaluation  Unit’s  evaluation  report.  CSR  remained  
Box 1:  World Bank Evaluation of CSR Work 
In the 20 years since CSR was realised as important, it has been a learning experience for 
the World Bank. The learning has been described as taking place in three phases: 
1. The first phase in the 1980s dealt with “endemic overstaffing accompanied by 
unsustainable wage bills”.  
2. In the second phase, somewhere in the late 1980s, “a combination of misaligned 
organisational structures, poor human resources, and inadequate incentives weakened 
administrative capacity to carry out core government functions” became an important issue.  
3. Finally, by the early 1990s, the Bank found that “the credibility and accountability of 
state institutions strained under the weight of cumbersome CS rules, political 
interference, and cultures of non-performance”.  
The Results. “On average, only 33 percent of closed CSR interventions and 38 percent of 
ongoing efforts achieved satisfactory outcomes. Even when desirable, outcomes were often not 
sustainable. Downsizing and capacity building initiatives failed to produce permanent reductions in 
CS [civil service] size and to overcome capacity constraints in economic management and service 
delivery. There was no evidence that civil servants began to ‘own’ and follow formal rules such as 
codes of ethics in any meaningful way. As a result, institutional reforms could not substantially limit 
arbitrary action by bureaucrats or politicians”.  
Four factors undermined the efficacy of Bank-supported interventions:  
1. “Poor Information on CSR Performance. With the exception of fiscal data, 
standardised indicators of CSR performance were neither fully developed nor 
operationalised for monitoring and evaluation (M&E).  
2. “Limited Role for Strategic Management and Cultural Change. Did not envision 
appropriate roles for strategic management (including the reorganisation of work) and 
cultural change in strengthening incentives to perform. M&E often failed to acknowledge 
the detrimental impact of conventional Bank processes—such as the use of expatriate 
consultants and Project Implementation Units (PIUs)—on the credibility of standard 
operating procedures, as well as on the morale of civil servants. On a related point, the 
Bank’s skepticism about promoting greater autonomy for public sector managers meant 
that CSRs often compelled bureaucrats in client countries  to be efficient without 
empowering them to be innovative. 
3. “Absence of Coordination Arrangements, Checks, and Balances. Efficacy and 
sustainability suffered as borrowing governments carried out interventions without 
establishing the institutional arrangements necessary for coordination between 
government bodies or providing checks and balances to arbitrary action. For example, 
poorly defined authority between budgeting and personnel departments allowed 
overstaffing and the proliferation of ministries to continue, even after downsizing efforts. 
Similarly, in the absence of external checks on political interference, CS hiring remained 
a primary mode of dispensing patronage. Broad groups of stakeholders such as public 
employees, citizens, and private firms rarely participated in the process of defining and 
enforcing new rules and norms governing CS activities. 
4. “Failure to Appreciate Labour Market and Institutional Constraints. While all three 
contextual constraints—macroeconomic performance,  labour market t rends, and 
institutional endowment—significantly influenced CSR outcomes, the Bank relied 
mainly on budget scenarios to guide the design of CSRs. Neither ESW nor M&E used 
models of CS systems that adequately accounted for labour market and institutional 
trends (for example, projected demand for CS jobs or the level of political appointments 
in the CS) when elabourating reform scenarios”. 
 
Source: World Bank (1999).   5 
motivated by budgetary considerations and focused on downsizing. Although 
recognition of capacity building and institutional reforms came later, not much 
was achieved. What is interesting is that the assessment suggests that 
• ownership was not developed, 
• incentives were not changed adequately, 
• CSR performance was not measured nor used for reform purposes, and 
• morale remained low as “expatriate consultants and Project 
Implementation Units” led the reform. 
Reform must be people-centred and able to change people’s incentives to 
vest them in the ongoing change. CSR should remain budget-focused and, as the 
World Bank (1999) says, technical, i.e., concentrated on design and processes 
that are externally driven. In that sense, the CSRs of the 1990s lost track of the 
motivation and sense of involvement of those whom the reform was actually 
going to affect. This paper argues that the incentives of the public servant must 
be central to the reform process. Without changing the incentives of the people 
who are going to implement these reforms, the reform process will be 
unsuccessful.  
Several approaches to reform have been developed over the last two 
decades, although it is fair to say that success in this area has really been 
achieved in more advanced countries such as the UK, New Zealand, and the US 
(see Box 3). These experiences have been widely discussed and have generated 
several useful strategies for reform. Important lessons include (i) getting the role 
of the government “right” by moving it out of production and only into market 
regulation and management, and (ii) managing the government through 
outcomes a nd performance auditing. The Thatcher approach to government 
through autonomous executive agencies with clear mandates and professional 
management is an example. The American Reinventing Government (REGO) 
movement is also an important process for involving the sector in changing it in 
line with the goals of PSR.  
In this paper, we emphasise only the incentives and human resource 
management (HRM) approach primarily because it is a neglected element of 
CSR, especially in developing countries. The CSR literature has tended to 
follow PSR movements as they happened in the West and attempted to apply the 
underlying thinking to developing economies. As we show with data, the 
evolution of the public sector in these countries has been substantially distorted 
and has certainly distorted the incentives of the civil servant. We need to study 
these incentives carefully to see how we can vest these people in any proposed 
reform strategy. For this, we also suggest that, for a successful reform, we need 
to move beyond economics to disciplines like sociology and management.  
As mentioned earlier, the civil servant’s incentives must be central to the 
reform process. Most sequencing strategies suggest that wage structures shift   6 
somewhere in the process of change. It must be remembered that the incumbents 
have settled into the current incentive system. For example, if there are extra 
allowances to be gained form managing more departments, a manager will seek 
to run more departments. Similarly, if there are rewards for committee work, the 
more committees the better. If customs and police positions yield rent-seeking 
positions, they will attract more people. Unless a reform process addresses this 
issue, incumbents will “game” the reform.
6 Consequently, it is important to 
begin with a clear vision of incentives and their impact on the reform process.  
 
3.  THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:  
FACTS ON INCENTIVES 
Because the public sector has traditionally been viewed merely as a 
transfer mechanism, there is little systematic evidence available on input 
utilisation in the government or on the quality of its output. Reliable data on the 
structure of public sector wages and employment are not available for most 
developing countries.
7 Studies that provide information on certain limited 
aspects of public sector management are only meant to offer a snapshot of the 
public sector at a certain point.
8 It is not possible, therefore, to derive from them 
panel data of sufficient length to allow a formal empirical investigation.
9 This 
section begins with a summary of the available evidence on wage, employment, 
and human capital policies in the public sector. 
 
3.1.  Wages 
Public wages decline in real terms over time. Evidence from a number of 
countries suggests that real wage levels for public s ector employees have 
declined over long periods in many developing countries.
10 Table 1 presents the 
trend growth in real wage levels in the general government. Our estimates 
include all the countries for which data were available and for as many years as 
the data permitted. The trend regressions indicate that, since the mid-1970s, real  
                                                 
6The gaming of reform is a very rich area of research that is not explored directly here. See 
Mil (2003) for an interesting analysis of this area in Pakistan.  
7Snapshots on the basis of sparse and disjointed data series are obtained from some 
individual efforts, which demonstrate the nature of problem. It is surprising that there has been no 
systematic effort to collect more information on this issue, which is considered to be at the heart of 
economic development.  
8See Lindauer and Nunberg (1994), Chaudhry, Reid, and Malik (1994), and Van Ginneken 
(1991). 
9The available information is itself affected by public sector inefficiencies. For example, 
increasing public sector inefficiency leads to the problem of ghost workers, which makes it difficult 
to accurately record public sector employment [see Lindauer and Nunberg (1994)]. 
10For example, as far back as 1983, Gould and Amaro-Reyes noted that, in Africa and Latin 
America, mid- and low-level salaries were so low at times that employees could not even afford a 
balanced diet.   7 
Table 1  
Trends in Real Wages in General Government (Annual Percentage Change) 
Country  Period 



























































































Source: National authorities. 
Note: The coefficient is significant at the 5 percent level. 
        *Estimated from a fixed-effects pooled regression of the countries listed.    8 
wage levels in the general government declined in 19 of the 29 countries listed 
in the table. In the remaining five countries that registered positive growth rates, 
the highest was Ghana at 4 percent per annum. In transition economies, large-
scale liberalisation of prices accompanied by wage controls has led to a decline 
in real wages in the public sector, particularly during the initial stages. For the 
sample as a whole, real wages declined by about 9 percent per annum. 
Larger wage declines in poor countries. The decline in government 
wages relative to per capita incomes is not uniform across countries. Poorer 
countries experienced a larger decline during the 1970s. During the 1980s, the 
decline was reversed, but not enough to correct the declining trend over the 
entire period.  
Declining public-private wage differential. Some evidence of trends in 
the ratio of public to private wages for countries for which data were available is 
presented in Table 2. Once again, we see that t his ratio declined for most 
countries,
11 on average, at about 6 percent per annum. Flanagan (1995) finds that 
fulltime employees in the private sector earn considerably more than their 




Trends in Ratio of Government to Private Sector Average Wages  
(Annual Percentage Change) 
Country  Period  Trend 
Bolivia 
































Source: National authorities. 
           *Estimated from a fixed-effects pooled regression of the countries listed.  
                                                 
11Through a fairly comprehensive cross-country study of government wages relative to the private 
sector, Heller and Tait (1984) showed that, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the ratio of public wages 
to private wages was lower in developing countries than in industrial countries. This evidence is somewhat 
surprising since one would expect that, in developing countries, the quality of human capital would, on 
average, be higher in the government relative to the underdeveloped private sector.  
12After controlling for schooling and potential experience, survey results show that workers 
in new private firms earn 18 percent more than those in current or former SOEs.   9 
Wage compression. Wages at upper levels of public administration have often 
reduced by more than those at lower levels. Figure 1 illustrates this phenomenon 
for several countries. With a base year of 1975 = 100, the figure shows the 1985 
wage level at the lowest (solid) and highest (hatched) wage levels in the public 
sector.  
 
Fig. 1.  Wage Compression in the Public Sector 
 
Source: Haque and Aziz (1999). 
 
Note that, with one exception, real wage declines occurred at both the 
highest and lowest wage levels in the public sector in this sample.
13 The 
numbers at the end of each country’s bar group present the ratio of the wage 
indices given in the figure for each country, expressing the relative 1985 real 
wage index for those at the lowest end of the wage scale as a multiple of the 
relative 1985 wage index for those at the highest end, converted to an index 
number. Since 1975 is the base year, a ratio in excess of 100 indicates an 
increase in wage compression. The countries are ranked in decreasing order 
of w age compression during the 1975–85 period. Note that wage 
compression is observed for all the countries in the sample except Morocco 
and Benin.
14 
                                                 
13See Van Ginnekin (1991), Lindauer and Nunberg (1994), Chaudhry, et al. (1994), and 
Haque and Sahay (1996). 
14The data show that public sector wages are, in most cases, lower than private sector wages 
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3.2.  Employment 
The political imperative of protecting employment. During this period 
of wage compression and decline in real public sector wage levels, the share of 
the labour force employed in the sector showed a shallow increasing trend. The 
situation is illustrated in the left-hand portion of Figure 2, which shows the 
percentage of the population employed in t he public sector in a group of 
developing countries drawn from the previous sample
15 from 1975 through 
1985, a period corresponding to that for which we have relative wage data. This 
steady share of employment has occurred despite the fall in wages in the public 
sector relative to other sectors. In more recent years, the right-hand portion of 
Figure 2 suggests that the public sector started to grow in the 1990s after some 
years of fiscal restraint. 
 
























































































Source: Haque and Aziz (1999). 
 
Stabilisation at the expense of public-sector efficiency. Some recent 
studies on stabilisation programmes suggest that fiscal adjustments often involve 
a decline in real wages in the public sector. The data show that short-term 
stabilisation  programmes have a significant negative impact on real wages 
[Kraay and Van Rijckeghem (1995)] while protecting the government’s overall 
                                                 
15The number of countries varies across years according to the availability of data.   11 
wage expenditures [Hewitt and Van Rijckeghem (1995)].
16 It would seem that 
such programmes protect employment at the cost of real wages. 
 
3.3.  HRM in the Public Sector
17 
Hierarchical, unified, and non-meritocratic structures. Perhaps 
because of the paternalistic nature of the state, the civil service in most poor 
countries tends to be fairly rigid, often preventing entry and rewarding seniority 
rather than performance. Barriers to entry to the civil service are high while 
pension rules are such that length of service—well beyond a civil servant’s 
productive years—is rewarded. Public expenditure management is our only 
measure of bureaucratic performance and it measures only budgetary allocations 
without really concerning itself with the service that each budgetary unit is 
supposed to provide [Premchand (1996, 1996a)].  
Pay scales are typically organised in a pyramid of hierarchical grades that 
differentiate people and positions according to the skill level and knowledge 
required for particular jobs. Table 3 provides one such example. Additionally, 
the whole civil service can be disaggregated vertically into narrower pyramids 
representing specific occupational cadres. For example, the medical cadre could 
comprise government-employed doctors and paramedics. Often, different cadres 
have their own range of grades organised according to skill requirements that are 
difficult to compare across cadres. The combinations of grades and cadres 
provide a series of horizontal and vertical organisational structures. Table 3 
shows how the Ethiopian civil service was organised into cadres and grades in 
the 1990s. Each grade was a ssigned a salary scale, with incremental steps 
leading from a minimum salary to the maximum for that grade (salary scales for 
different grades often overlap.) Each roman numeral in this example represents a 
whole scale. Salary scales reward length of service and accumulated experience. 
Incremental (within-scale) salary increases are often standard, while promotion 
to the next grade is contingent on satisfying certain requirements and receiving a 
positive job evaluation.  
Wage setting. Civil service salaries are revised annually or biennially in 
most industrial market economies. In contrast, they are adjusted infrequently in 
many developing countries. The process of adjustment is not rational and can be 
politically charged, often involving a commission that r ecommends an 
adjustment for the service as a whole.  
                                                 
16Hewitt and Van Rijckeghem (1995) examine the determinants of central government wage 
expenditures for 99 countries during 1980-90. They found that heavily indebted countries tend to 
have lower central government wage expenditures relative to GDP.  
17Given the amount of funding that this area has received, it is difficult to understand why 
there has been no effort to develop data on several areas of HRM in some developing countries. 
Light (1999) has used survey methods not only to determine the size of government but also the 
labour market characteristics of the public service market.    12 
Table 3 
















I             
II            Grade 1 
III          Grade 1  Grade 2 
IV      Grade 1  Grade 1  Grade 2  Grade 3 
V      Grade 2  Grade 2  Grade 3  Grade 4 
VI      Grade 3  Grade 3  Grade 4  Grade 5 
VII      Grade 4  Grade 4  Grade 5  Grade 6 
VIII      Grade 5  Grade 5  Grade 6   
IX      Grade 6  Grade 6  Grade 7   
X    Grade 1  Grade 7  Grade 7  Grade 8   
XI    Grade 2  Grade 8  Grade 8  Grade 9   
XII    Grade 3  Grade 9  Grade 9  Grade 10   
XIII    Grade 4  Grade 10  Grade 10     
XIV  Grade 1  Grade 5         
XV  Grade 2  Grade 6         
XVI  Grade 3  Grade 7         
XVII  Grade 4  Grade 8         
XVIII  Grade 5           
XIX  Grade 6           
Source: Robinson, quoted in Mukherjee (1993). 
 
Perks and other emoluments. Unified pay structures are prevalent in the 
public sector and are expected to create a fair and transparent method of 
payment. In fact, their importance is declining in relation to the total rewards of 
the public sector, which are now increasingly intangible, unrecorded, and non-
monetary in nature (areas 6, 7, 8, and 9 in Box 2).  
Figure 3 shows scant data on how important cash perks can be and how 
they have evolved in some countries. In the more advanced Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, they are held to a 
minimum (about 10 percent). Cash perks, however, may not be as large as other 
unrecorded perks. For example, in Pakistan, the major reward of public service 
is the provision of prime government-owned land at subsidised prices.
18 
Additionally, corruption gains have become increasingly attractive, adding an 
important area to the reward structure taxonomy of Mukherjee and Manning 
(2002) presented in Box 2.
19 
                                                 
18The preservation of perks is an important deterrent to reform [Mil (2003)]. 
19Perks have an additional political economy dimension. When such large gains come to the 
public servant in this non-transparent manner, he or she is truly invested in preserving the status quo. 
Mere salary increases of a moderate kind may not move him or her from that equilibrium [Mil 
(2003)].   13 
 
 
Fig.  3.  Cash Allowances as a Percentage of Total Current  
Monetary Rewards 




























































































Source: World Bank public sector website. 
Box 2: Reward Structure in the Public Sector 
Government pay determination is widely supposed to be transparent (as public money is being 
used) and fair (by paying equally for jobs of equal value—such paying men and women equally 
for the same work). However, there are several components to civil servants’ compensation and 
rewards. As the table below shows, the total compensation package is a combination of current 
rewards and future expectations, and contractual and intangible rewards. 
Contractually-provided   
Monetary  In-kind 
Non-contractual/ 
Intangible 





Allowances   4. Transportation, 
housing, meals, 
telephone, travel, 




6. Trips abroad, 
training  





Personal emoluments = cells 1 and 4 (current monetary rewards and allowances)  
Personal disposable income = personal emoluments less employer deductions for income tax 
withholding, provident fund/pension contributions, etc.  
Total compensation = cells 1, 2, 4, and 5 (contractually provided current rewards and 
allowances)  
Total rewards = cells 1 –9 inclusive (contractual and non-contractual, current and expected 
rewards and allowances)  
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Training. The World Bank Administrative and Civil Service Reform 
website provides some limited evidence of training in developing countries 
to show that it is not a priority item. In surveys, most employees reported 
limited or no formal training for their job and claimed to have learnt on their 
own while on the job. Assessing training is exceedingly important in the 
rapidly advancing technology of today, for without continuous training, 
public sector work skills would erode faster than those of their private sector 
counterparts, who are presumably being forced to remain current by the 
market.  
Aged, immobile public sectors. Historically, civil service pension 
schemes were established as a form of reward for long service. Hence, most 
benefit designs for these schemes are “back-loaded”—with little in terms of 
transfer of pension rights in case of early departure—to encourage lifetime 
employment. However, as countries develop socially and economically, 
what used to be a reward for long service becomes a barrier to  labour 
mobility, prohibiting the flexibility to attract new blood through natural 
attrition, which is vital to modernising the civil service for the 21st century. 
Beginning in the 1980s, many industrialised countries realised the need for 
the civil service  to be modernised, and started integrating civil service 
pension systems with national social security systems. The integration of 
civil service plan benefits with national social insurance plan benefits occurs 
to varying degrees in different countries. Total integration takes place when 
civil servants are treated no differently from private sector employees, as in 
Argentina and Peru, and throughout eastern Europe where preferential 
schemes no longer exist.  
A less complete form of integration occurs when a  civil service pension 
system is operated by the state much like any other occupational pension plan in 
the private sector. Examples of this can be found in the UK, Japan, and other 
industrialised countries.
20 Countries that have not switched to pension reform 
and to introducing mobility into and out of the civil service find they face the 
problem of an aging civil service. In many of these countries, the average age in 
the civil service has increased over the years while the motivation to work and 
the skill level, with limited training opportunities, has declined.
21 
                                                 
20Overall, an increasing number of civil service plans are being integrated in one way or 
another into national pension systems. In countries where integration has occurred, 60 percent of 
these integrated pension system frameworks were implemented after 1980. Some countries like 
Chile, Uruguay, Peru and Jordan have taken steps to terminate the civil service preferential scheme 
for new employees as part of the process of implementing pension reform for their national systems. 
Others such as the US and Hong Kong have established fully funded, defined contribution schemes 
for new employees to allow for full portability of pension rights. 
21This could be an advantage in a holistic CSR effort, since portability of pensions and some 
inducement could make retirement fairly desirable for an older, unmotivated, skill-obsolescent 
public servant.    15 
4.  LEARNING FROM INCENTIVES AND  
ORGANISATION THEORY 
The theory of incentives in organisations has been a fertile area of 
research in recent years and should be applied to CSR in developing countries. 
Essentially, these theoretical developments are based on two important 
assumptions, which are described below. 
• First, the fundamental point of departure for understanding any 
human behaviour is the recognition that selfishness is inherent in all 
human actions. This view is fundamentally opposed to the 
commonly held view that derives from 19th century liberal thought 
and sees the government as a benevolent protector of the poor. The 
public servant, as the name implies, is considered selfless, kind, and 
caring-devoid of the need for worldly goods and desires. He or she 
will, therefore, work for the common good, irrespective of family 
and future. Clearly, this view is incompatible with the paradigm of 
selfishness. 
• Second, information is costly to collect;  people are likely to have 
different amounts of information available to them, which they will use 
to their advantage. This means that all exchange must take into account 
information asymmetries and the cost of obtaining information. Public 
sector regulatory intervention is often required where information 
asymmetries prevent the market from working. However, this also 
gives selfish public servants the opportunity to use asymmetric 
information to their advantage. 
This world of selfish individuals who possess asymmetric information 
leads to certain understandable forms of behaviour:  
• moral hazard (hidden action), when one party has incentive to shift risk 
onto another uninformed party; and 
• adverse selection (hidden information), when one party has more 
information about a market transaction than other. 
An analysis of contractual relationships known as “agency theory” has 
been developed to deal with these issues. An agency relationship is defined as an 
explicit or implicit contract in which one or more persons—the principal(s)—
engage another person—the agent—to take actions on behalf of the principal(s). 
The contract involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent. 
Agency problems emanate from conflicts of interest, which arise out of selfish 
behaviour in the presence of incomplete information and are common or 
endemic to most economic relationships.   16 
Agency analysis has been used extensively to analyse how workers, 
managers, directors, or investors respond to various incentives.
22 One of the 
more fundamental results of this literature can be summarised as follows: 
Proposition 1. Incentive compatibility. Even when effort is not directly 
observable, rewards based on observables (output, monitoring, etc.) can 
motivate self-interested individuals to work hard [Holmstron (1979)].  
This is a key insight-incentives matter. Many traditional markets have 
been using this insight for centuries. Since an employer cannot know the amount 
of effort a person puts into a job, he or she will promise to pay according to 
some observable that is closely linked to effort. Hence, we observe contracts that 
offer formal incentives such as piece-rate wages, bonuses, or stock options that 
are based on verifiable measures of performance such as items produced and 
profits. Even within firms and government agencies, foremen, fellow 
employees, bosses, or boards of directors monitor individuals’ work outputs to 
determine their wage increments and bonuses on the basis of relative 
performance evaluation.  
These contracts rely on observable performance and work well when the 
link between such performance and reward is strong (e.g., piece-rates). Such 
incentives are high-powered and intrinsic to the contract. As always, contracting 
presupposes that the terms of the contract will be enforceable and that the risks 
associated with the contract will be shared. Government-mandated guarantees of 
employment outside the contract would vitiate incentives to the detriment of the 
arrangement.  
Contracts based purely on high-powered incentives (e.g., piece rates and 
profit sharing) transfer the entire risk of the contract to the employee. Since both 
job security and income security are important to most people who are averse to 
risk, incentive contracts normally combine some form of secure payment (such 
as wages) with some periodic bonus as a reward for effort.  
Piece rates work best when a job is simple and one-dimensional, such as 
single-activity jobs, assembly-line tasks, the production of craft-related items, or 
the harvesting of agricultural produce. Most jobs however, require carrying out 
more than one task: teaching, for instance, involves delivery of material, 
grading, maintaining discipline, research, participating in training, and 
collegiality. Rewarding teachers on the basis of grading alone will bias their 
efforts in that direction to the detriment of other tasks. Holmstrom and Milgrom 
(1991) have shown that, in the case of multitasking, it is difficult to write 
adequate pay-for-performance contracts and alternatives must be found.  
Proposition 2. Multitasking. When a job requires an agent to do more 
than one task, and not all tasks are observably distinguishable, direct high-
                                                 
22See Gibbons and Waldman (1999) and Prendergast (1999) for excellent comprehensive 
surveys of the literature.    17 
powered incentives may not be as effective as peer reviews and monitoring 
(internal and external) and subjective evaluations. [Holmstorm and Milgrom 
(1991), and Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999, 1999a)].  
It is not surprising then to see firms using other methods to buttress pay 
for performance so that performance over several tasks can be balanced out. 
However, monitoring and subjective evaluations, too, can lead to biases such as 
nepotism and extra power to supervisors, and need to be carefully implemented. 
Not only do most real-life situations involve multitasking, they also require 
considerable teamwork, which introduces the possibility that some people in a 
team may carry an extra load.  
Proposition 3. Teamwork. When teamwork is required, “free-riding” 
can be reduced through peer monitoring and pressure. Team-based profit sharing 
can be an incentive in this case [Holmstrom (1982)].  
Proposition 4 . Extrinsic incentives. Another important vehicle for 
inducing good effort is career ladders. People work hard and reveal their talents 
in the early stages of their career in order to climb a career ladder. Career 
concerns provide powerful extrinsic motivation for workers—extrinsic, because 
the contract pays only for past performance, i.e., a future promotion is based on 
the evaluation of the employer [Fama (1980) and Holmstrom (1982)]. 
Promotions and career ladders are like tournaments, where the prize must 
increase with each higher level attained. This means that the prize increases as a 
person moves up the career ladder, leading us to the general proposition on wage 
structures below.  
Proposition 5. Convex wage structures. Returns on ascending a career 
ladders must increase (i) to offer a higher prize at the top, and (ii) because the 
impact of more senior levels on productivity is magnified down the ladder 
[Rosen (1986)]. This means that the wage line in any firm must be convex when 
seen from below, i.e., progress in the organisation is met with increasing 
rewards (see Figure 4). This runs contrary to the liberal egalitarian thesis and 
suggests that, to induce higher productivity, we must live with higher inequality. 
For the career concerns system to work, the tournament/promotion 
process must be credible, i.e., on balance, it must be seen to work fairly and on 
the basis of merit. Of course, this means that seniority alone cannot be rewarded 
and young talent must be allowed to m ove up as and when it is revealed. A 
byproduct of the promotion system is that workers work harder to reveal 
themselves when young and moving up the career ladder. Older workers, 
especially those who have peaked in an organisation, have limited incentive to 
work hard and may just “coast along” for a while.  
Not only do all these problems affect the public sector, they are probably 
magnified by its size and multifaceted objectives. In addition, the public sector 
has to face another very important issue: that of answering to many masters. For 
the private sector, not only is performance easily measurable through the   18 
profitability of shareholders’ value, employers are all commonly interested in 
only that measure. The public sector has no such clear measure and i s also 
accountable to more than one master. For the executive, legislature, broader 
public, and within the public, the particular interests or groups that they serve all 
have expectations and goals. How should this be handled?  
Proposition 6. Common agency. When an agent (e.g., the civil service) 
is answerable to many principals (e.g., the parliament, executive, consumers, 
and interest groups), incentive contracts should be supported by hard transparent 
missions that are constitutionally determined. In addition, devolution to self-
selected and motivated agents and decentralisation in the form of direct payment 
and management by beneficiaries of the product or service could improve 
efficiency [Dixit (1997)].  
Devolution, delegation, and decentralisation are therefore necessary, not 
only for the sake of distributing political power as commonly assumed, but also 
to provide appropriate incentives for economic efficiency. Given the nature of 
the government, devolution needs to be hard and credible and, hence, should be 
constitutionally or legally determined.  
 
5.  INCENTIVES IN THE DESIGN OF PUBLIC  
SECTOR REFORM 
What do we learn from this review of incentives theory? If we contrast 
the state of public sector HRM policies and its incentives in Section 3 with the 
brief summary of incentives in the organisation literature given in Section 4, we 
can draw several lessons for staffing a new reform plan for the public sectors.
23  
In view of Proposition 1, the situation of declining real wages (W1 above) 
in the public sector, widening public/private wage differentials (W2), and rigid 
pay scales based on non-meritocratic HRM (H1) do not constitute an incentives 
structure appropriate to good behaviour. In response, we see the growing 
importance of perks and emoluments that are external to the job (H3). The 
difficulty in providing adequate incentives to civil servants may lie in the 
attempt to maintain rigid and uniform pay scales across the civil service. This 
also makes wage setting a very difficult task from a political point of view (H2).  
The public sector product is extremely heterogeneous, ranging over 
services such as health, police, education, sanitation, and justice. Most CSR 
efforts seek to maintain the notion of a unified civil service with uniform pay 
                                                 
23Since our focus is on incentives, we will not be reviewing issues such as “getting the 
government out of production and markets and back into governance and regulation,” “separating 
policy from service delivery”, and “private provision of public goods” (see Box 3 for the these 
principles and how they were applied in the UK). Note how these principles are derived from 
incentives theory.  The conjecture offered by this paper is that the reason these principles did not 
take root in developing countries is that incumbents’ incentives were not aligned with the intended 
reform and its objectives.   19 
scales and performance measures over this extremely heterogeneous group of 
people. Proposition 1 says that wages must be closely tied to the product and 
hence runs counter to this approach. We can therefore note our first lesson on 
incentives in PSR.  
Lesson 1 . Heterogeneity of the public sector. While equity and 
standardisation is desirable, large, uniform, and monolithic (uniform pay scales, 
standardised increments, and promotion policies) public sectors (of the post-
colonial and progressive eras) may not be amenable to incentive-compatible 
contracting, given the heterogeneity of public sector tasks.  
How should this be done? To begin with, this lesson argues against one 
broad unified reform effort and suggests a more heterogeneous process of 
reform anchored by a vision of public sector efficiency. Perhaps each agency 
should have the latitude to set its own performance measures and appraisal and 
reward systems, while a separate monitoring agency (such as a civil service 
department) keeps these under review to gauge how the systems evolve in 
relation to each other.  
No doubt equity and some measure of budget control are required to 
ensure that stresses and strains do not develop across the public sector. 
Moreover, some review process can and should be put in place. For equity 
purposes, the market valuation of various jobs, skills, and professions can be a 
good signal. After all, the public sector has to compete for skills in the market.  
Given the heterogeneity of the public sector and its objectives, it is 
important that managers of various agencies be given control over their 
instruments, personnel-related decisions, and working practices, and be held 
accountable for their objectives. Promotions, job assignments, and other 
personnel-related decisions must remain firmly in t heir hands, although of 
course subject to some external oversight (and not as in current practice [see H 
1]).
24 
Lesson 2. Perks. Perks should be eliminated because they are not related 
to job performance. High-powered incentives require that all payment be made 
in cash and be fully related to some performance measure.  
Perks (such as the provision of cars and housing, and the payment of 
utility bills), which have crept up in the civil services as salaries, have declined 
in real terms and have the potential to set up alternative incentive mechanisms 
that could run counter to productivity. In any case, perks are also difficult to 
maintain, adding to expenditures and creating grounds for further rent-seeking. 
In addition they run the risk for being valued at less than what it costs the 
government to provide them. For all these reasons, eliminating perks through 
and monetising their value in salaries could prove an efficient measure.  
                                                 
24The outmoded concept of transfer from one job to another, which still prevails in some 
countries, is only means for promoting rent-seeking [Wade (1982)] or political control and should be 
discontinued.    20 
Should the public service always pay competitively relative to the private 
sector? Many studies have shown that the desire to engage in public service is 
strong among some people. Light (1999) has used a US-based survey to show 
that, even today, young people are keen to engage in public service and join 
non-government organisations (NGOs) only because they find government 
service not attractive enough and too bureaucratic to fulfill this ambition. 
Heckman, Smith, and Taber (1996) have shown how motivated public servants 
perform on the job purely for the sake of service.  
Lesson 3. Public service. Public service can be an important incentive 
for joining the public sector if the sector is public service-oriented [Light (1999) 
and Heckman, et al. (1996)]. Indeed, the government can attract the motivated 
with an opportunity to engage in public service. This was the ethos according to 
which the British colonial civil services were built and acquitted themselves 
very well over a long period. For this ethos to work, public service must be held 
in some regard by society and clearly seen to provide benefits. An inefficient 
public service that is perceived with suspicion and rated poorly by Transparency 
International will not be able to offer the right incentives.  
It has been shown that the dominant culture of the civil service is 
determined by the prevailing incentive mechanism. If the appropriate incentives 
for public service and productivity in the public sector are not in place, 
corruption or rent-seeking can become the primary incentives attracting those 
with a proclivity for these activities.  
Corollary to Lesson 3. Allocation of talent. Public sector orientation 
(rent-seeking and power-hoarding) will attract the commensurate talent 
[Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991) and Acemoglu (1995)]. Unfortunately, 
this is a self-reinforcing equilibrium  and can lead to loss of confidence in 
governance, eventually affecting growth and productivity. Beyond a certain 
limit, such equilibria have led to civil strife.  
The public sector need not pay a fully competitive wage, not only 
because of the self selection that occurs between the business-minded and those 
given to public service, but also because public sector employment could be a 
form of signaling achievement and talent. In advanced countries, public sector 
experience often improves earnings and opportunities in the private sector 
[Haque, Montiel, and Sheppard (2000)]. Of course, the public sector has to be 
efficient and worthy of respect for it to maintain its professionalism and good 
conduct.  
Lesson 4. Signaling and credibility. Good performance in the public 
sector can be an important market signal for future employment if the public 
sector is recognised as credibly efficient and skill enhancing [Spence (1973)].  
Public sector experience can be valuable in the marketplace, especially if 
the sector provides valuable market training. A good example of this is how 
armies currently market themselves as employers in advanced countries. They   21 
recruit on the basis of their training and claim that this training has market 
potential, teaching skills such as engineering and broadcasting. Moreover, army 
veteran status also indicates that a person has had the discipline and motivation 
to put him or herself through a rigorous training and endurance process.  
For this model to work, the government should also train its personnel 
continuously. Surveys of young job seekers show that, in a dynamic job market, 
these entrants know they are unlikely to work for only one employer or use only 
one skill during their entire career [Light (1999)]. Consequently, training and 
skill improvement are important components of their demands. However, as we 
have seen, governments in developing countries do not seriously invest in this 
area (H4 in Section 3). 
Some of the most successful Asian economies emphasise the importance 
of recruiting talented people and improving their skills through constant 
training. Hong Kong and Singapore carry out aggressive recruitment at entry 
level, entice high-flyers with the promise of further training, and generally pay 
salaries comparable with the private sector. Singapore, a serious reformer, has 
maintained a systematic focus on efficiency as the sole criterion for retaining or 
retiring senior civil servants, with seniority no longer the basis for promotion. 
Monetising perks and establishing a public sector as an employer that 
creates skills for future employment allows the public sector wage to be set at a 
reasonable discount to the public sector. The reform is graphically envisaged in 
Figure 4. Given that wage compression and old approaches to HRM will have to 
end (as noted in Lesson 1), the public sector salary profile will move from the 
concave (from below) compressed line to the dotted line. The difference will 
have to be carefully monitored and maintained to ensure adequate staffing 
quality in the public sector.  
Wilson (1989) notes that government agencies face the risk of being 
assigned multiple tasks. The risk of multitasking is large and must be dealt with 
by means of “mission setting.” He provides examples of agencies such as the 
Tennessee Valley Authority, National Forest Agency, and Texas Prisons that 
have, through clear mission setting, achieved good results.  
Lesson 5. Missions and autonomy. Clear (legislated or well publicised) 
missions for government agencies help overcome the common agency problem, 
but only if these missions can be pursued with adequate autonomy (Wilson 
1989). The study also notes that, in developing a sense of “mission,” the 
organisation must eschew vague objectives and define a set of “critical tasks” or 
“operational goals.”
25 The “culture” of an organisation needs to be changed to 
identify these critical tasks and assess how best to deal with them.
26 The 
“mission” is a single culture that is widely and enthusiastically shared by an 
organisation’s members.  
                                                 
25Wilson (1989), pp. 25, and 32–34. 
26Wilson (1989), p. 93.   22 
Wilson (1989) also emphasises the incentive cost of pursuing multiple 
goals. He stresses the need to focus on a subset of tasks even at the cost of 
sacrificing other tasks. This pursuit of focus may lead well-run agencies to resist 
being granted new tasks—“conglomerate agencies rarely can develop a sense of 
mission; the cost of trying to do so is that few things are working well.”
27 We 
thus have a related lesson on focus.  
Corollary to Lesson 5. Focus. Each agency must carry out its mission 
focusing on a few measurable tasks. Taking on additional tasks, while politically 
desirable, should be avoided.  
It needs to be stressed that a government agency can truly remain focused 
on its mission if it is independent or at the very least autonomous. This is well 
illustrated in central  banking, where there is now a global convergence of 
thinking on the importance of central banks functioning as independent 
professional organisations that focus only on price stability. As a result, almost 
all countries have passed and implemented laws to this effect. Inflation every 
where has come down and this improvement can, in part, be attributed to this 
development. With inflation under control and this seen to be a result of central 
bank independence, independence too has received more political support. Thus, 
it seems that a strong sense of mission with its concomitant changes in culture 
and productivity improvements can be self-reinforcing because organisations 
will be perceived as more effective and consequently be given more freedom.  
Autonomy and independence are also strategies that can help deal with 
the “common agency problem” that is endemic to government. A central bank or 
regulatory agency, even a public sector school, has to answer to many masters—
the parliament, executive, and community—and there is always the possibility 
of it being captured by special interests.  
Lesson 6 . Decentralisation, delegation, and devolution. The public 
sector provides a variety of services to many different subsets of society. As the 
common agency problem suggests, it is best that these services be provided in 
the most decentralised fashion possible to allow maximum interface, both in 
terms of evaluation and payment, between the immediate beneficiaries of the 
service and its providers [Dixit (1997) and Wilson (1990)]. 
While public sector agencies must have the mission and autonomy 
necessary for good performance, performance itself must be monitored as 
directly as possible by those who demand it. Moreover, the financing of that 
service must in some sense be controlled by the very people who demand it. The 
best example of this is the school voucher system, which allows parents to 
choose their children’s schools even though the government subsidises 
schooling. In every area, solutions such as this would provide community-level 
control over the valuation and financing of the public sector, and elicit more 
responsible performance from it.  
                                                 
27Wilson (1989), p. 371.   23 
6.  BEYOND ECONOMICS 
We have seen that PSR in developing countries has been driven mainly 
by macroeconomic budgetary considerations.  Its success requires that we 
understand microeconomics and incentives theory. However, to remain confined 
to economics on the reform of the most important and, in many cases, largest 
sector of the economy—the public sector—would also be folly. For its success, 
many disciplines need to be combined. In connection with our subject—
incentives and HRM—the management and sociological literatures have fairly 
interesting ideas and suggestions.
28 There are at least two ideas that have not had 
an impact in this area, especially in poor countries: (i) professionalisation, and 
(ii) leadership in successful PSR and management.  
The professionalisation of public services is important for several 
reasons: 
• In these days of the knowledge worker, even public sector positions 
must have the requisite skills. The days of the generalist in charge of 
government or even an agency are over.  
• Professions are communities that share knowledge standards and a 
culture of work, and arrange peer-reviewed contests for achievement 
and excellence. In doing so, professionals keep their colleagues’ work 
under review at all times. Professional networking and monitoring can, 
therefore, be an additional safeguard against the common agency and 
multitasking problems. Since the professional is networked in his or her 
profession and expects rewards through the peer review process, he or 
she also has proper incentives.  
• Professionalising an agency and networking it with the professional 
community further protects autonomy as direct interference in 
professional and professionally observed work is that much more 
difficult. Wilson (1989) also acknowledges this: “The maintenance of 
some agencies depends so critically on their appearing professional and 
nonpolitical that it would be foolhardy for an elected official to 
compromise that appearance.”
29 
Consequently, we can state another lesson that has not surfaced in the 
CSR/PSR literature: 
Lesson 7. Professionalisation. Professionalising a public service places 
the agency, its mission, and its tasks under scrutiny of the profession. Moreover, 
                                                 
28Of course, checks and balances, performance, and other forms of auditing, transparency, 
and openness, as well as recourse to legal action are all needed in constituting a good public sector.  
29Wilson (1989), p. 199.   24 
professionals employed by the government are additionally disciplined by 
professional peer pressure and the incentives of external professional mobility.
30 
For professionals to be attracted to the public sector, their incentives—
both monetary and non-monetary—have to be correctly set. As noted above, the 
public sectors in many developing countries are monolithic and provide only 
limited entry possibilities, especially into senior positions. Moreover, as the 
World Bank (1999) has  alluded, the extensive use of consultants for 
policymaking purposes leaves limited room for professionals to take pride in 
their professional work. An important incentive for a professional is to see his or 
her work flourish and for it to be associated with his or her name. Peer 
acknowledgement, which lies at the heart of professional honor, can only be 
obtained if the work of a fellow professional is visible and clearly seen to be his 
or hers.  
Given that senior positions in the public sector are in the hands of 
generalist incumbents and policy-making and research positions in the hands of 
donor consultants, for a professional to take up a position in the government is 
tantamount to professional suicide. It is not surprising therefore that 
professionals tend to stay away from the government, while those who join it 
lose their skills and their standing fairly quickly.  
One important element of the new HRM approach in the public sector 
should then be to open recruitment to professionals at all levels. Concomitantly, 
this new approach would encourage both inward and outward mobility in the 
public sector. The current practice of lifetime public sector careers will have to 
be given up in deference to the requirements of the new, more flexible, 
professional labour market.  
Corollary to Lesson 7. Mobility. To attract the best professionals and 
keep them under peer review, public service jobs at all levels must be open to 
external competition. Similarly, public sector employees should be encouraged 
to seek jobs in the market. Encouraging greater mobility into and out of the 
public sector will also prevent the age structure of the public service from 
becoming too skewed in the direction of older workers. As we have seen, 
younger workers are more energetic and career conscious, and keen to upgrade 
their skills constantly. The more successful CSRs, such as in Singapore, have 
resulted in younger groups taking leadership of the service.  
Equally important, the local professional should be allowed to take 
leadership of thinking, research, and policy in his or her environment. This 
would necessarily mean that, under the new arrangements, the well-funded 
                                                 
30Dewatripont, et al. (1999a) formally model professionalism as the specialisation in a single 
task that hence requires less monitoring. They note the advantages of hiring such professionals in an 
environment of multitasking. In that sense, they only capture the essence of the first advantage of 
professions that has been mentioned here, that of technical competence, but not the other two— 
networking/peer review and professionalisation as a protective device.    25 
donor consultant would have to follow the professional’s lead in government. 
Perhaps some of this funding could, as Haque and Khan (1999) argue, even be 
directed towards building reform leadership in agencies that need to be 
modernised. 
This naturally brings us to another concept from the management 
literature that PSR/CSR thinkers appear to have bypassed: leadership. For a 
reform to become a reality, it should have leaders—people who can envision 
and are committed to the changes proposed, whose personal reputations are 
linked to this change, and who will gain from it in terms of professional 
standing. Without these leaders, reform is a technical exercise and we should not 
be surprised if it is not successful.  
Lesson 8. Leadership . Reforming the public sector at every level and in 
every agency has to be built around leaders who have the necessary drive, 
vision, and knowledge, and are willing to take the necessary risks.  
Note that a successful reform needs not one but many leaders. In this 
sense, one major flaw in CSR work has been its continuing reliance on a central 
leadership, most often the finance minister. This is because the reform process 
has been driven by budgetary considerations. A successful reform that improves 
public sector productivity has to stretch over a myriad of public sector agencies 
with their heterogeneous objectives, cultures, and environments. In each area, 
reform will deepen according to the depth of its leadership. Consequently, much 
effort should be put into finding and developing reform leadership in each area 
and agency.  
Developing leadership in the public sector runs the risk of autocratic 
control. Here, leadership has to be defined in modern management parlance, 
where the emphasis is on learning, creativity, vision and consensus building, 
passion, risk taking, leading, and gaining trust [Kotter (1996) and Bennis 
(1989)]. A leader must be able to build an organisation beyond him or her self 
and his or her tenure. He or she should then not be judged on title and privilege 
but on the professional quality of his or her team and their commitment to 
change. Additionally, one needs to ask whether he or she has built a dynamic 
learning organisation that will continually accept change. Finally, the 
organisation should be resilient to changes in leadership, in particular, should be 
able to survive the leader who created it.
31  
Leadership backed by competent teams will also insulate the reform from 
political interference, which is essential to its success. Such insulation will also 
                                                 
31The role of the charismatic leader and the routinisation of charisma into bureaucracy was 
discussed by Max Weber in the 19th century. Surprisingly, PSR literature has not discovered it. The 
leaderships that modern management thinkers like Bennis, Kotter, and Covey are thinking about is 
instrumental, goal-oriented leadership and not quite the singular charisma that Weber was talking 
about. It is much more a received ability to lead teams—something that can be acquired, though with 
dedication and passion, rather than inborn.    26 
enhance the credibility of the reform and strengthen the reform process while 
softening any resistance to it. 
A large part of public sector work has to be done in teams and, as we have 
discussed, incentives within teams can be diffused and autocratic structures can stifle 
team development (Proposition 3). The US government adopted a mechanism for 
inducing better team behaviour by instituting an award for good team performance 
in the wake of the REGO movement for improving government cost-efficiency and 
productivity: “The Vice President’s Hammer Award is reserved for teams of 
pioneers who create an innovative and unique process or  programme t o make 
government work better and achieve results Americans care about.”
32  
A similar initiative was carried out in 1982 in Singapore with the 
introduction of work improvement teams (WITS). Developed on the pattern of 
quality control circles employed by successful and innovative private sector 
companies, WITS allowed groups of staff at different levels to openly discuss 
obstacles to quality and devise practical solutions for service improvement. The 
Botswana government introduced a productivity and quality i mprovement 
programme in l993 by creating WITS within various institutions and 
departments. The Malaysian programme to enhance positive attitudes provides a 
good example of a practical approach to establishing appropriate values within 
an entrepreneurial public sector.  
The Hammer awards and WITS initiatives point to the need to develop 
teams and leadership in every area of public service. This approach is in line 
with current management thinking, which emphasises horizontal team-based 
organisations and is contrary to the practice of development policy which seeks 
to concentrate power in the hands of some reform leadership. We can therefore 
conclude that the design and implementation of PSR must go beyond economics 
into management, sociology, and the other social sciences without losing sight 
of incentive economics. Without the correct motivation, reform will stay 
unimplemented and theoretical.  
 
7.  CONCLUSION 
CSR has traditionally focused on downsizing and changing the 
procedures and structure of the service without emphasising the human element: 
incentives, professionalisation, mobility, leadership, and teamwork. It is not 
surprising then that the results have been less than desirable and that change has 
been severely resisted from within the civil service. This paper contends that we 
can learn from incentives theory as well as from other branches of the social 
sciences and management in order to design a PSR that will be incentive-
compatible and has a greater chance of success.  
                                                 
32See http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/awards/hammer/ for more information on the 
Hammer awards.   27 
Such a reform will have to use incentives in a way that improves the 
public servant’s welfare while also improving government efficiency and 
productivity. For this, rewards must be aligned with productivity and the old 
monolithic, uniform, and non-meritocratic HRM of the civil service abandoned 
and replaced with a new method of management that is much closer to practices 
in the private sector.
33 The Thatcher reforms of the 1980s are a good example of 
the principles laid out here (see Box 3).  
 
Box 3: The Thatcher Reforms 
In 1988, Margaret Thatcher’s government adopted the following principles for running 
the British government: 
1.  Separation of service delivery and regulatory functions into discrete blocks, 
each one called an executive agency. 
2.  Agencies to have  control over their budgets, personnel systems, and 
management practices. 
3.  Agency chief executive to be paid adequately to attract the talent needed. 
Performance bonuses of up to 20% of their salaries could be paid but they 
must be forced to reapply for their jobs every three years. 
4.  Agency chief executive officers (CEOs) to negotiate a three-year performance 
contract with their department, specifying the results they would achieve and 
the management freedoms they would be given. 
5.  Setting of annual performance targets for each agency. 
6.  All agencies on trial for their lives every five years.   
Results 
1.  126 executive agencies, which employ almost 75 percent  of all civil servants.  
2.  CEOs now have the freedom they need to manage effectively, but both their 
pay and job security depend on their agency’s performance against 
quantifiable standards. 
3.  If an agency does not perform, it can be abolished, privatised or restructured 
after its five-year review.  
Overall, the British had shrunk their civil service by 15 percent by 1994-95, and 
performance has steadily improved. Operating efficiency has increased by at least 2 
percent a year. On average, agencies expended 4.7 percent less operating money in 
1994-95 than they had the year before. 
Source: Haque and Aziz (1999). 
 
                                                 
33Some governments are successfully experimenting with flexible working conditions 
(Australia and New Zealand), moving collective bargaining from the entire public service to the 
workplace (Australia and the UK), and the application of private sector law to the public sector 
(New Zealand).    28 
To the extent that the public service is valued for its intrinsic (doing 
good) and extrinsic rewards (experience), recruits may be willing to settle for 
discounted compensation, but the discount cannot be as large as what some 
countries  currently offer their public servants. For the public sector to be 
perceived to offer such intrinsic and extrinsic rewards, it must credibly be seen 
to be efficient and skill enhancing.
34 Successful Asian reformers emphasise the 
importance of recruiting talented people and improving their skills through 
constant training. Hong Kong and Singapore carry out aggressive recruitment at 
entry level, entice high-flyers for further training, and generally pay salaries 
comparable with the private sector. Singapore has maintained a systematic focus 
on efficiency as the sole criterion for retaining or retiring senior civil servants, 
with seniority no longer the basis for promotion.  
There are two important differences in applying the standard theory to the 
public sector. First, a typical public servant may have to work towards more 
than one objective as well as on multiple tasks; second, the public sector 
answers to more than one owner, with no clear measure of performance such as 
profit or value maximisation. Incentive  theory suggests that, to resolve these 
problems, the public sector should be organised around autonomous agencies 
that have a clear sense of mission as well as a focus on that mission in its work. 
Measurable outcomes based on that sense of mission can be used to incentivise 
workers in the agency. Increasing departmental and agency autonomy allows for 
innovations in producing, measuring, and rewarding individual performance. 
This greater autonomy, however, has to be undertaken while maintaining the 
traditional civil service standards of integrity, merit, and professionalism. 
Greater autonomy with a strong sense of mission is now widely accepted in the 
running of central banks, which by law are given the independence to focus on 
price stability. This model has yet to be extended beyond central banking. 
Decentralising public sector management is also recommended to prevent 
excessive politicisation of any public sector organisation or agency. As far as 
possible, such an agency should be managed and paid for by the users of its 
output. In New Zealand, for example, authorities considered abolishing the 
department of education, which dominated both policy-making and the delivery 
of education services, and decentralising education to the community level.  
Another illustration of this principle of decentralisation is the distancing 
of implementation from policy development (see Box 3). Examples of this are 
the establishment of statutory boards in Singapore, executive agencies in the 
United Kingdom, and the experience of corporatisation in Australia. These have 
                                                 
34Imaginative training initiatives have also been initiated in a number of countries. In 
Mauritius and the UK, training is tailored to rank; and in Singapore, Ghana, Australia, and Trinidad 
and Tobago, customer service training for staff has been introduced. In the Canadian public service, 
staff training and development is given high priority with close attention paid to its cost-
effectiveness.    29 
allowed a clear delineation between the functions of policy formulation and 
policy implementation. In this way, areas of relative freedom from bureaucratic 
constraint have been created in which a more business-like climate can be 
generated. Establishing an operational unit around a clearly demarcated set of 
functions allows the development of operational goals, uniting staff with a 
clearer sense of mission.  
Looking beyond economics, PSR is a continuous process that is spread 
out over a considerable period. It also has to permeate through a large number of 
public sector organisations, agencies, and units. It is only natural then to look for 
local leaders of the reform everywhere and, as far as possible, use modern 
management principles to guide the reform. Too often, reform has been 
centralised around a high office and a few individuals to the detriment of the 
reform. Professional networks can act as an agency of restraint both on 
politicisation and on professionals operating in the public sector. However, this 
will depend on the extent of professionalisation allowed in the public sector.  
While the broad objectives of PSR are similar in most countries, no 
unique solution or approach has emerged as a “model” that could be universally 
adopted. Success will depend on an incremental approach: a step-by-step 
process within the framework of a clear long-term vision. Rather than pursue a 
uniform reform through the entire civil service, a more prudent approach might 
be to first achieve efficiency-enhancing reform in key organisations and let the 
downsizing and change radiate outwards from there.
35  
Reform must, however, be based on a recognition that people are at the 
heart of public service. As a result, managing human resources must be at the 
centre of any CSR effort—not technology or market forces. The people who are 
at the centre of this change can either be its architects and beneficiaries or its 
losers and therefore opponents of change. The design and implementation of 
reforms must, therefore, be sensitive to this important fact. It is essential that the 
reform is led by individuals who understand such a process of change. 
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